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The aim of this paper is to contribute to the scarce empirical literature that evaluates the effects of 
public financial support to innovation on innovation innovation and productivity in services. We apply 
propensity score matching techniques to analyze the impact of public financial support to innovation in 
Uruguayan firms. We use two waves of innovation surveys that allow us to distinguish between 
manufacturing and service sector firms. The results indicate that there is no crowding-out effect of 
private innovation investment by public funds, and that public financial support seems to increase 
private innovation expenditure effort, particularly in manufacturing. Financial support also induces 
increase in R&D expenditure and innovative sales, being these effects larger for services. Public funds do 
not significantly stimulate private expenditures of firms that would carry out innovation activities in the 
absence of financial support. Probably due to the short time period in which the evaluation was 
conducted, we found little evidence of an effect on applications for patents and productivity. 
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The need for public support to innovation and particularly, public financial support, rest mainly on the 
assumption that innovation is a non-rival good (i.e. that can be used by multiple firms) that cannot be 
fully protected because its output is, basically, knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of how to produce new or 
improved goods or services) and most of it is tacit knowledge (i.e. not codified). Therefore firms cannot 
appropriate fully the return to innovation investment. In other words, we have a problem of positive 
externalities of innovation. This generates a gap between the social return of innovation and the private 
return of innovation, having as a consequence that the firm will underinvest in innovation activities with 
respect to the social optimum.  
As pointed out by Hall and Lerner (2010) there is some evidence that points out that imitations are not 
free, and that they can cost between 50% and 75% of the original R&D investment. This can mitigate the 
above mentioned externality problem, but in any case the problem still persist since the returns are not 
fully appropriated by the original investor. Moreover, this available evidence is for manufacturing; we 
can think that the problem is more important for service innovations where innovations rely less on 
codified knowledge (that can be more easily protected) and presumably, where the costs of imitating 
are smaller. 
But the case for public financial support goes beyond the externality problem mentioned above. Even 
assuming that this problem can be solved, for example, with some intellectual property protection 
instrument, there are other characteristics of the innovation investment that justifies public financial 
support. For instance, returns to innovation investment are highly uncertain and the asymmetric 
information that exists between the innovator and the investor could be greater than in other type of 
investment, leading to important moral hazard and adverse selection problems.2 Therefore, credit 
constraints and high cost of credit is likely to affect the level of innovation investment and consequently 
the innovation output. The intangibility characteristic of services and the non-technological and more 
ad-hoc characteristic of many service innovations could make these problems even worse. 
These theoretical considerations have stimulated public intervention in different countries with the 
objective of increasing innovation investment, innovation and productivity in services. But so far the 
evidence of the positive (or otherwise) impact of these interventions in the service sector is almost 
unavailable.  
So far, most of the available empirical literature has focused its attention on public financial support 
policies to research and development (R&D) activities and their impact on R&D expenditure in the 
manufacturing sector. As pointed out by Hall and Lerner (2010) the focus on R&D instead of the broader 
concept of innovation investment is largely due to reasons of data availability and measurement. In 
addition, most of the available studies are for OECD or European countries, and we are lacking evidence 
for less developed countries. 
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 Given that the innovator has more information about the project than the investor, it can use this advantage to 
increase his profit in detriment of the investor. 
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Our paper aims to contribute in helping fill some of these gaps, through an impact evaluation of public 
financial support to innovation using quasi-experimental methods and innovation survey data from 
Uruguay, that allow us to distinguish between manufacturing and service sector firms. More specifically, 
the paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, it presents an impact evaluation of 
public financial support to innovation on innovation expenditure and productivity, and hence the 
analysis is extended beyond the R&D context. Second, we analyze the possible heterogeneity of impacts 
on services vis a vis manufacturing. Finally, our paper adds to the scarce evidence available for 
developing countries. 
Our findings show the absence of a crowding out effect, either full or partial, between public and private 
innovation expenditure, though the presence of subsidies hardly stimulates private innovation spending 
of firms engaged in innovation activities in any case. Moreover, firms that had received financial support 
increase R&D expenditure relative to those that did not received. We found similar effects in the 
services and manufacturing sectors. While there is no crowding effect in any of the two sectors, we 
found that public financial support stimulates innovation expenditure. There are no effects on 
productivity, probably due to the short time period in which the evaluation was conducted, but 
financially supporting the firms has a positive effect on the share of innovative sales.  
The paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses briefly the available evidence on the impact of 
public financial support to innovation. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data. Section 4 
presents the main results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Public financial support and innovation: the available evidence 
Most of the available evidence focuses its attention on developed countries, does not have the focus on 
services firms and use mostly R&D expenditure as the outcome variable. David et al. (2000) carry out an 
extensive survey of this literature, finding substitution effects between public and private R&D in one-
third of the studies analyzed. More recent studies have focused (mostly) on matching methodologies to 
evaluate the crowding out effects. Along these lines, different studies have found that public financial 
support stimulates privately financed R&D, so that the crowding out hypothesis is rejected. Examples 
are Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) who use data from a survey of German manufacturing firms; Duguet 
(2004) who uses a pool of French R&D-performing firms; and Gonzalez and Paso (2008) who use a 
sample of Spanish firms to evaluate the effect of subsidies. As for the service sector, Czarnitzki and Fier 
(2002) by studying a panel of German service firms found that financial support stimulated private 
expenditure on innovative activities. However, as far as we know there are no studies that allow direct 
comparison of the impact that a certain policy imposes on the service and manufacturing sectors. 
As for evidence regarding the policy impact on innovation output (rather than on R&D and innovation 
efforts, which are inputs for innovation), Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) found no significant effects of 
public support for innovation on patent applications from a survey of Flemish firms; while Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger (2004) found that the impact was positive on this variable for a set of German manufacturing 
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firms and Czarnitzki et al. (2011) found a positive impact on the number of new products introduced by 
manufacturing Canadian firms.  
Evidence on the impact on firm performance, particularly productivity, is scarcer and indirect. Czarnitzki 
et al. (2011) found that the impact was not significant on firms’ profitability. Wallsten (2000) found no 
significant impact on employment for American high-tech small firms, this may owe to the fact that such 
policy effects often do not arise until after several years after policy implementation, so that they may 
not be observed throughout the short periods of analysis. On a different note, Lokshin and Mohnen 
(2013) found for Dutch firms that fiscal incentives had a positive impact on wages of R&D workers. 
The available evidence of the effects of public financial support on innovation is sparse for emerging and 
developing countries. Few examples can be found in Hall and Maffioli (2008), Lopez and Tan (2010), or 
Crespi et al. (2012). 
Hall and Maffioli (2008) synthesized the results of a series of impact evaluations of Technology 
Development Funds (TDFs) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Panama. The authors evaluated the impact on 
TDFs recipient firms using data from innovation and industrial surveys. They found that TDFs do not 
crowd out R&D from private sources and that they have a positive impact on the intensity of R&D. Also, 
although low-cost credit had a more positive effect than matching grants on R&D projects—suggesting 
that different types of financing impact firms differently—matching grants were more effective for new 
innovators. The authors also found that participating in a TDF results in a more proactive attitude 
toward innovation strategy for firms. Although Argentina and Brazil were not included in this part of the 
study, using a firm’s willingness to engage with external financing and knowledge sources as proxies for 
innovation strategy shifts, the authors found that TDFs have a positive effect on innovation. Conversely, 
participation in a TDF did not positively affect patent grants or new product sales, which were used as 
measures of innovative output, although the authors note rightly that the time frame may have been 
too short to observe the full effects of TDF participation on this regard. Evidence concerning the 
potential impacts on firm performance was not uniform: TDF participation was found to positively 
impact firm growth but not firm productivity. The authors argue that this can also be due to the short 
time period in which the evaluations were conducted, and that additional impact evaluations based on 
longer panel data are needed to shed some light on long-run effects. 
López-Acevedo and Tan (2010) provide an evaluation of small and medium enterprises credit programs 
in Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru. The authors found positive gains in labor productivity, sales and 
employment in Chile, and higher value added, sales, export and employment in Mexico. In Colombia, the 
results suggest positive effects on exports, investment in R&D and total factor productivity. Finally, in 
Peru the findings show significant positive effects on sales and profits. Confirming the findings of Hall 
and Maffioli (2008), López-Acevedo and Tan (2010) note that some of the estimated impacts on firm’s 
performance do not materialize until after several years.  
Crespi et al. (2012) evaluate the effects of financial incentives for R&D (matching grants and contingent 
loans), given by Colciencias in Colombia, on firm’s beneficiaries economic performance. With a dataset 
that allows the authors to look at long term effects, the authors find significant impact on firm 
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performance of public funding from Colciencias. More precisely, the authors found that introduction of 
new products and labor productivity increased around 12% and 15% respectively, with these effects 
becoming more significant between three to five years after the firms started being treated. 
In appendix A we summarize the results of 26 evaluations. 
 
3. Empirical strategy and data 
 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of public financial support on some firm’s outcome 
variables (innovation investment, innovation, productivity). As it is well known the main problem to 
perform such evaluation is that we cannot observe what would happen with treated firm’s outcomes 
variables in case they wouldn’t get public financial support, i.e. the counterfactual. Therefore, we have 
to find a suitable “proxy” for the counterfactual. Of course, the firms that didn’t get public financial 
support are clear candidates to form a comparison group (or control group). The problem here is that it 
is possible that these firms didn’t get the public financial support because they have some 
characteristics that also affect the outcome variables. For example, it could me more difficult for small 
firms to get public financial support, and we know that the size of firms affect innovation. Therefore if 
we compare the innovation performance of the firms that got support with that of the firms that didn’t 
get support, we will find that the supported firms innovate more, but this could be simply because they 
are bigger, and not as a consequence of the public financial support program. 
Luckily, under some assumptions we can circumvent this problem. The strategy followed here was to 
use propensity score matching (PSM) methods.3 In what follows we will explain briefly the rationale 
behind it and make explicit some methodological decisions taken. 
The main parameter of interest in this paper is: 
τ = 1
|D = 1 − 0
|D = 1, 
where τ is the average treatment effect on the treated, 1
|D = 1 is the mean value of the 
outcome variable 1
 (for example innovation investment) given that the firms received public 
financial support, and 0
|D = 1  is the counterfactual, i.e. the expected value of outcome 
variables, 0
, for the firms in the treatment group in case they haven’t received public financial 
support (of course this can never be observed). D=1 means that the firm belongs to the treatment 
group. Unfortunately, we do not observe the latter.  
What we can observe is 0
|D = 0, the mean of the innovation investment for firms that do not 
belong to the treatment group (D = 0
 and did not receive treatment. But of course 0
|D = 0 
must not need to be equal to 0
|D = 1 and therefore when using the former as a proxy for the 
latter we can be introducing a bias in our estimation. Note that, 
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|D = 1 − 0
|D = 1 − 0
|D = 0 + 0
|D = 0, 
and therefore 
1
|D = 1 − 0
|D = 0 = τ + , 
where ≡ 0
|D = 1 − 0
|D = 0.  
As said before, if firms with some especial characteristics tend to be selected in the treatment group and 
these characteristics affect outcomes, then we will have a bias. On the contrary if the assignment to 
both groups is completely random we should not be concerned with the existence of this bias. But 
because this condition normally does not hold in the case of innovation survey data we have to do 
something else. 
Under the assumption that the differences between the treated and the control group comes from 
observable characteristics (e.g. firms’ size, capital and knowledge intensity, etc.), that are not affected 
by the treatment, we can proceed to find firms that are similar on these characteristics in both groups 
and compare them. One possible identification assumption is to assume that given a set of observable 
covariates X which are not affected by treatment, potential outcomes are independent of treatment 
assignment (unconfoundness or conditional independence assumption, CIA).  
This implies that selection into the treatment is only based on observable variables, X, for what we can 
control for. Usually, X is of high dimension. Hence, to deal with this dimensionality problem we can 
balance propensity scores. We can use the Xs to estimate the probability of being selected for treatment 
P(D=1| X)=P(X ) (using a probit or logit model in the case of binary treatment) and then use this 
probability for finding similar firms in both groups (treated and control groups). 
The PSM estimator for average treatment effect on the treated is:    
τ
 = 1
|D = 1, PX
 − 0
|D = 0, PX
. 
Under the assumption of conditional (on the propensity score, PX
) independence of outcome 
variables with respect to treatment, this estimator is unbiased. 
An additional important condition to be able to use PSM, besides CIA, is that we must have enough 
treated and control firms on the common support. More formally we need: 0 < D = 1|X
 < 1. This 
condition ensures that firms with the same values of X have a positive probability of being both 
participants and non-participants, and we avoid predicting perfectly if a firm belongs to control or 
treatment group. 
The matching algorithm used in this work is the Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) with replacement, 
using a caliper of 20 percent of the standard deviation as suggested in the literature. We use 
oversampling, taking advantage of the big number of potential controls in our sample. In particular for 




Our vector of variables X is composed of six variables plus 2-digit sectoral dummies: firm size (proxy by 
the number of employees at the beginning of the period), foreign owned (if foreign capital is greater 
than 10% of firm’s capital in the current period), patent (if the firm obtained a patent in the period, we 
use this variable as proxy for the innovation performance of the firm in the past), capital intensity 
(defined as K/L at the beginning of the period, where K is capital and L the number of employees) and 
firm’s age. We can argue reasonably that these variables are not affected by the treatment. 
We combine the propensity score matching with Mahalanobis metric matching over size and the 
sectorial dummies.  Hence, a treated firm is matched with the closest control firm of the same sector, 
and similar size using the distance defined by the Mahalanobis distance. 
 
3.2 Data 
We apply the above methodology to evaluate the effect of financial support granted to Uruguayan 
service and manufacturing firms during the period 2004-2009. For this purpose we make use of two 
waves of Innovation Surveys (IS): 2004-2006 and 2007-2009. 
The IS data is collected in parallel with the Economic Activity Survey (EAS); same sample and statistical 
framework. All the firms with more than 49 workers are of mandatory inclusion. Units with 20 to 49 
employees and with fewer than 19 workers are selected using simple random sampling within each 
economic sector at ISIC 2-digit level up to 2005. Since then, random strata are defined for units with 
fewer than 50 workers within each economic sector at ISIC 4-digit level.  
We matched both IS with the 2004 and 2007 EAS because we needed information on the size of the firm 
at the beginning of the period, capital (fixed assets), and productivity. In order to avoid endogeneity 
problems associated to the variables size, capital and productivity, we use these variables at the 
beginning of the period of the survey. All the other variables used in the empirical exercise come from 
the IS. When matching with the EAS some firms are lost because of sampling problems.  
In order to reduce the loss of observations we use an imputation procedure, in order to recover the 
information for the missing variables at the beginning of the period for those firms that are not in the 
EAS. The imputation procedure is based on a regression between log(size(t-1)) against the age of the 
firm, and sectoral dummies. We use this regression to predict size in (t-1) for the missing observations. 
The same is done for the capital stock, and productivity. Note that the technique uses the information 
available at the beginning of the period of the survey, not at the end of period to avoid causal effects 
interacting. In any case, as a robustness check we present the results with the reduced sample, i.e. 
without the imputation procedure. 
For the service sector, the final number of included firms in the IS is 1868; 885 from the first survey, and 
983 from the second one. For the manufacturing sector, the final number of included firms is 1727; 816 
for 2004-2006 survey, and 911 for the second one. 
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The treatment variable is: financial support. We consider a firm to be financially supported if it has 
received some financial support from the Public Sector4 in the period of reference. In first instance, we 
evaluate the effect of financial support on innovation expenditure (IE) effort, i.e. expenditure on 
innovation over sales. Total innovation expenditure comprises investment in design, installation of 
machinery, industrial engineering, embodied and disembodied technology, marketing, and training. We 
are able to distinguish between total and private firms’ innovation investment. Then, we analyze the 
effect of financial support on R&D expenditure (both internal and external) over sales, share of 
innovative sales, patents applied for, and productivity. Productivity is defined as the logarithm of sales 
over total employment.  
Table 1 bellow reports the number of firms in each sector, divided in KIBS (knowledge intensive business 
services) and traditional services, and high-tech and low-tech manufacturing sectors. Manufacturing 
sector firms tend to invest more in innovation activities than the service sector. The High-Tech sector is 
the sector that innovates most, followed by the KIBS sector. The third column of the table shows the 
manufacturing bias of innovation policies. While more than 4% of the manufacturing firms have received 
public financial support in the period 2004-2009, only 2% in the service sector obtained financial 
support.  
Table 1. Firms with innovation activities and financial support. Period 2004-2009. 
    % with % with  





Services 1868 38.5 2.1 
KIBS 628 42.0 1.9 
Traditional 1240 36.7 2.3 
Manufacturing 1727 42.3 4.2 
High-tech 399 52.4 5.8 
Low-tech 1328 39.3 3.7 
Note: Author’s calculations based on the 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 IS. 
 
Table 2 reports the innovation effort (IE/sales) for firms with and without financial support. On average 
firms from the manufacturing sector invest more in innovation activities than firms from the service 
sector. One fact to highlight is that the private effort of firms with financial support (column 2) is notably 
higher than the effort of firms without financial support and with innovation activities (column 4) in the 
manufacturing sector. On average, the difference is 0.9 percentage points, being even higher in the 
High-tech sector (1,77pp). On the contrary, in the service sector the private effort of those that received 
financial support is lower than those firms that undertook innovation activities without financial 
support; on average, 0.7 percentage points lower. This is driven by traditional services firms, while KIBS 
present a higher private effort. 
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 The survey includes information regarding financial support received from the Public Sector (excluding public 
firms from the definition of public sector). 
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This raw data can lead to us to the conclusion that a crowding out effect could exist in the service sector, 
while not in the manufacturing sector. Our empirical strategy will try to disentangle if this is an effect 
derived from the fact that public financial support tend to be directed to firms that tend to invest more 
in the manufacturing sector, while to firms that show a poor performance in innovation in the service 
sector. This will be done by comparing firms with similar probability of obtaining financial support. 
Table 2.Innovation effort in firms with and without financial support (in %). Averages for period 2004-
2009. 
  Innovation effort  
  With Without 
  Total Private All  IE>0 
Services 6.37 3.62 1.61 4.33 
KIBS 9.77 6.93 1.75 4.28 
Traditional 4.91 2.21 1.54 4.35 
Manufacturing 7.50 5.05 1.66 4.16 
High-tech 6.27 5.07 1.64 3.30 
Low-tech 8.08 5.04 1.67 4.50 
Note: Author’s calculations based on the 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 IS   
 
Finally, table 3 presents the mean of the selected matching variables of the control and treatment group 
by sector. Firms tend to be larger in the treatment group than in the control group. At the same time, in 
the treatment group firms tend to have obtained more patents than in the control group. Firms in the 
treatment group tend to be more located in Montevideo (the capital of the country), belong to 
networks, and to have more stores, while with respect to age and ownership status there are no clear 
differences.   
Table 3. Mean comparison of financially supported firms and non-supported firms on selected 
controls 
  Services KIBS Traditional 
  With Without With Without With Without 
Size (log employees) (t-1) 4.48 3.85 4.11 3.87 4.64 3.84 
Foreign owned 7.5% 10.4% 16.7% 13.8% 3.6% 8.7% 
Age (years) 23.9 18.3 11.6 13.7 29.4 20.7 
Obtained patent 5.0% 1.2% 8.3% 1.3% 3.6% 1.2% 
Network 30.0% 19.9% 50.0% 18.3% 21.4% 20.6% 
Group 15.0% 15.6% 16.7% 16.2% 14.3% 15.3% 
Stores 4.7 3.9 1.6 1.4 6.0 5.1 
In Montevideo 85.0% 74.3% 100.0% 87.2% 78.6% 67.8% 
  Manufacturing High-tech Low-tech 
  With Without With Without With Without 
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Size (log employees) (t-1) 4.24 3.80 4.09 3.56 4.30 3.87 
Foreign owned 9.7% 11.5% 8.7% 17.3% 10.2% 9.9% 
Age (years) 32.29 25.56 35.96 28.01 30.57 24.84 
Obtained patent 2.8% 2.7% 0.0% 3.2% 4.1% 2.5% 
Network 16.7% 7.9% 17.4% 10.1% 16.3% 7.2% 
Group 18.1% 13.2% 8.7% 16.0% 22.4% 12.4% 
Stores 1.85 1.74 1.57 1.60 1.98 1.79 
In Montevideo 83.3% 78.0% 91.3% 87.0% 79.6% 75.4% 
Note: Author’s calculations based on the 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 IS.       
 
4. Results 
We will present results for the complete sample of firms, that is, manufacturing and service sector firms 
together. The main idea of the strategy, in order to reduce endogeneity issues, is to match observations, 
according to their pre-treatment behavior. For this reason, we choose to work with the size of the firms 
at the beginning of the period of reference of the IS: (t-1), capital per worker at t-1, and productivity at 
t-1.  
In the next section, we present results dividing the sample in manufacturing and service sector. We 
employ two different groups of observations to select the controls for the average treatment effects on 
the treated estimator: first of all, the full sample which includes observations with and without 
innovation expenditures; and in second place we restrict the sample to observations with innovation 
activities. In the first case, we take into account the potential effect of financial support on the 
inducement to undertake innovation activities. In the second case, we evaluate the stimulus of financial 
support on the effort considering that all supported firms would have performed innovation activities in 
the absence of support. 
4.1 Complete sample results 
In the first stage we investigate factors that influence the probability of receiving public financial 
support. The dependent variable takes the value one if the firm has got public funding, and zero in the 
other case. Table 4 displays marginal effects after Probit estimation. The first column takes all firms as 
the possible control group, while in the second column the sample is restricted to only firms that 
reported positive innovation expenditure.  
The vector of explanatory variables includes firm characteristics that may influence the probability of 
getting public funds. We included the size of the firm in a quadratic form, measured as the logarithm of 
the number of employees in t-1, age (proxy for experience), a dummy variable for foreign owned (when 
more than 10% is foreign owned), capital intensity (measured as fixed assets per worker) and 
productivity at t-1. We also, include a dummy indicating if the firm has obtained patents in the period of 
reference (as a proxy of past innovation effort), if belong to a network, or to a group of firms, if it is 
located in Montevideo, the number of stores of the firm and the age and its quadratic form. The dummy 
for obtained patents tries to control for the persistence in innovation, since obtaining a patent is a long 
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process; the obtained patent is probably consequence of past innovations. Finally, we included 33 
sectoral dummies (at 2-digit level). 
Table 4. Estimation of the propensity score 
  (1) (2) 
  All firms 
Only innovative 
firms 
      
Size 0.0408*** 0.0663* 
  (0.0147) (0.0374) 
Size^2 -0.00292* -0.00499 
  (0.00160) (0.00396) 
Foreign owned -0.0163*** -0.0405*** 
  (0.00588) (0.0156) 
Age -0.000182 -0.000475 
  (0.000287) (0.000693) 
Age^2 2.54e-06 6.49e-06 
  (2.66e-06) (6.22e-06) 
Obtained Patent 0.0129 -0.00653 
  (0.0222) (0.0327) 
K_L -0.000361 -6.85e-05 
  (0.00252) (0.00532) 
Productivity t-1 0.00315 -0.00434 
  (0.00362) (0.00898) 
Network 0.0123 0.00562 
  (0.00891) (0.0173) 
Group 0.000225 -0.00245 
  (0.00818) (0.0193) 
Stores -6.75e-05 -0.000243 
  (0.000152) (0.000452) 
Montevideo 0.00814 0.0181 
  (0.00638) (0.0163) 
Industry 
dummies yes yes 
      
Observations 2,914 1,382 
Log likelihood -423.1 -356.4 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results show that the most important determinant of the probability of receiving public funds is size. 
The larger the size of the firm, the larger the probability of receiving public funds. On the contrary, being 
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foreign owned decreases the probability of receiving public funds for innovation. These are the only two 
significant variables (with the exception of some sectoral dummies). 
According to our empirical strategy the matching is done using the calculated propensity score. Hence, 
some important assumptions need to be validated. The first is to check the common support or overlap 
condition. With this purpose we can perform a visual analysis of the density distribution of the 
propensity score in both groups.   
Figure 1. Propensity score of treated and potencial controls considering all firms (left panel) and only 
firms with positive innovation expenditure (right panel) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the calculated propensity score by treated and untreated group. Observations in the 
control group are more left skewed than the treatment group. But a comparison of the minima and 
maxima of propensity scored leads to the conclusion that significant overlap is achieved. When taken 
into account firms with positive innovation expenditure there are some firms that are off common 
support. We restrict the estimation to the region of common support of the propensity scores. 
Finally, since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, it has to be checked if 
the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control 
and treatment group. 
Table 6 shows that the treated group appears to be different from the potential control groups in some 
relevant variables before the matching. But similarity between treated and controls is achieved after the 
matching. As can be seen in table 6 the differences were significantly reduced and are not statistically 
significant. 
Table 6. Mean comparison of financially supported firms and non-supported firms on selected 




Table 7 reports the results for the average treatment effect of the treated, considering as performing 
variables the investment expenditure, private innovation effort and, the share of R&D in innovation 
expenditure, the share of innovative sales, the application for patent, and the (log) productivity.  
Results show that financial support has a stimulating effect on both private and total innovation 
expenditure. Financial supported firms invest 4.5% more of their sales in innovation than non-supported 
firms. This result indicates that not only no crowding-out effect exists, but also that firms invest more 
from their private budget.  
Financially supported firms spend 8% more of the innovation expenditure in R&D than non-treated firm. 
This result was expected since usually financial support is directed to R&D. Remember that this sample 
includes all potential firms in the control group, i.e. firms could also have zero innovation expenditure.  
Hence, this result can be interpreted as public financial support having inducement effects on 
innovation activities.  
Receiving financial support increases significantly the share of innovative sales relative to firms in the 
control group.  
Finally, receiving financial support has no statistically significant effect on productivity. This result is not 
surprising since we are looking at very short time horizon, and effects on productivity can appear 
%reduct %reduct
Variable Treated Control %bias bias t    p>t Treated Control %bias bias t    p>t
Size Unmatched 4.34 3.84 46.2 4.69 0.00 4.34 4.08 23.4 2.27 0.02
Matched 4.35 4.28 6.5 85.9 0.52 0.61 4.37 4.28 7.7 66.8 0.61 0.54
Foreign Unmatched 0.090 0.107 -5.8 -0.58 0.56 0.09 0.16 -20.7 -1.90 0.06
 owned Matched 0.091 0.146 -18.6 -221 -1.26 0.21 0.09 0.18 -25.3 -22 -1.77 0.08
Age Unmatched 29.342 21.816 33.7 3.90 0.00 29.15 24.80 18.6 1.98 0.05
Matched 29.491 27.513 8.8 73.7 0.64 0.52 29.51 28.05 6.3 66.4 0.45 0.65
Patent Unmatched 0.04 0.02 11.5 1.43 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.3 0.03 0.98
obtained Matched 0.04 0.03 6 47.5 0.41 0.69 0.04 0.04 -0.5 -50.5 -0.03 0.98
K/L Unmatched 0.634 0.620 1 0.08 0.94 0.64 0.73 -5.1 -0.40 0.69
Matched 0.639 0.686 -3.3 -236.6 -0.34 0.73 0.65 0.80 -8.3 -62.7 -0.93 0.35
Productivity t-1 Unmatched 13.738 13.361 36.1 3.59 0.00 13.74 13.67 6.5 0.63 0.53
Matched 13.746 13.739 0.7 98 0.05 0.96 13.75 13.91 -15.5 -138 -1.18 0.24
Network Unmatched 0.21 0.16 12 1.31 0.19 0.20 0.22 -5.6 -0.55 0.58
Matched 0.209 0.141 17.6 -46.6 1.32 0.19 0.206 0.195 2.5 54.3 0.19 0.85
Group Unmatched 0.171 0.147 6.6 0.70 0.48 0.165 0.200 -8.9 -0.87 0.39
Matched 0.173 0.169 1 85.4 0.07 0.95 0.168 0.221 -13.7 -54.4 -0.96 0.34
Stores Unmatched 2.883 2.781 0.5 0.04 0.97 2.917 3.982 -3.9 -0.29 0.77
Matched 2.90 2.27 3.3 -518.4 0.80 0.42 2.94 2.24 2.6 34.2 0.89 0.38
In Montevideo Unmatched 0.847 0.757 22.6 2.18 0.03 0.853 0.796 15.1 1.44 0.15
Matched 0.845 0.783 15.7 30.8 1.17 0.24 0.850 0.783 17.8 -18 1.26 0.21
t-testMean Mean t-test
All  firms in the potencial control Potential control with positive IE
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significantly later. Probably for the same reason, results show that there is no statistical effect on the 
application for patents in the current period.  
 
Table 7. Effects from financial support 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep variable IE effort 
Private IE 




Patents 3/ Productivity 
              
ATT 4.492*** 1.922** 8.242*** 14.63*** 0.0268 0.123 
  (1.230) (0.850) (2.643) (4.306) (0.0263) (0.0990) 
              
Treated group 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Off support 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Potential control group 2,803 2,803 2,803 2,803 2,803 2,803 
Notes: 1/ Share of innovation expenditure that is R&D, 2/ Share of sales due to innovation.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 100 replications *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Table 8 presents the results when we take into account only firms with positive investment expenditure.  
Results show now that financial support has no stimulating effect on private investment. This result 
indicates that no crowding-out effect exists. Firms add the amount of subsidies to their private 
investment, not substituting private investment by public funds, but also not increasing their private 
innovation investment. Results show that financially supported firms make larger R&D investment. On 
the other hand, there are no significant effects on the share of innovative sales, applications for patents, 
and productivity. 
Table 8. Effects from financial support. Firms with positive IE. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IE effort 
Private 





              
ATT 2.531** -0.107 5.427* 6.436 0.00561 -0.0151 
  (1.055) (0.937) (3.005) (3.928) (0.0250) (0.100) 
              
Treated group 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Off support 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Potential control group 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 
Notes: 1/ Share of innovation expenditure that is R&D, 2/ Share of sales due to innovation.  




To check the robustness of our results we use the same methodology, but without doing the imputation 
procedure. Now the treatment group is formed by 80 firms, while with the imputation procedure we 
had 109 firms. Results in tables B.1 and B.2 of appendix B indicate that results are robust to the 
imputation procedure.  Quantitative results are very similar, with the exception of the results for R&D. 
The impact is smaller when the imputation procedure is not considered. 
To summarize, the results lead to the conclusion that there is no crowding-out effect of private funds by 
public funds, and that public financing in Uruguay seems to induce some increase in private innovation 
effort, R&D and innovation expenditure. Also has positive effects on the sales derived from innovation. 
But public funds do not significantly stimulate private expenditures of firms that would carry out 
innovation activities in the absence of subsidies. Finally, probably due to the short time period in which 
the evaluation was conducted, there are no effects on applied patents and productivity. In what follows 
we will distinguish between service and manufacturing sectors.  
4.2 Services and Manufacturing sectors results 
Because of the existing heterogeneites between service and manufacturing firms, and therefore the 
different impact that financial support could have in both sectors, in this section, we present results for 
the manufacturing and service sector, separately.  
In table 10 the marginal effects of the probability of receiving public financial support are reported. Size 
is still a very important determinant in the service sector, while less so in the manufacturing sector. 
When restricting the sample to firms that show positive innovation expenditure, size becomes 
statistically insignificant. In the manufacturing sector, being foreign owned affects negatively the 
probability of being financially supported, while no other variable seems to have statistically significant 
effects on the probability, except some of the sectoral dummies. 
Table 9. Estimation of the propensity score 
  Services Manufacturing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control group All IE>0 ALL IE>0 
          
Size 0.00801*** 0.0175*** 0.0194*** 0.0116 
  (0.00212) (0.00629) (0.00682) (0.0124) 
Foreign owned -0.00714 -0.0249 -0.0357** -0.0545** 
  (0.00674) (0.0190) (0.0144) (0.0270) 
Age -0.000133 -0.000621 -4.91e-05 0.000109 
  (0.000282) (0.000816) (0.000701) (0.00119) 
Age^2 9.31e-07 4.29e-06 4.08e-06 5.32e-06 
  (2.37e-06) (6.38e-06) (7.02e-06) (1.16e-05) 
Obtained Patent 0.0243 0.0204 -0.00501 -0.0408 
  (0.0338) (0.0515) (0.0365) (0.0408) 
K_L 3.34e-05 2.85e-05 -0.00756 -0.00822 
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  (0.000974) (0.00262) (0.00873) (0.0138) 
Productivity t-1 0.00326 0.00427 0.00385 -0.0158 
  (0.00313) (0.00862) (0.00897) (0.0172) 
Network 0.00576 -0.00558 0.0298 0.0209 
  (0.00732) (0.0168) (0.0253) (0.0335) 
Group -0.00492 -0.0150 0.0110 0.0209 
  (0.00631) (0.0185) (0.0222) (0.0372) 
Stores -7.17e-05 -0.000261 -0.00238 -0.00335 
  (0.000121) (0.000425) (0.00339) (0.00563) 
Montevideo 0.00954* 0.0267 0.00308 0.00826 
  (0.00557) (0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0291) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
          
Observations 1,758 684 1,156 698 
Log likelihood -167.1 -135.1 -255.6 -218.9 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
In tables B.1 and B.2 and figures B.1 and B.2 in the appendix we report the balance test for the 
covariates for treatment and control groups, and the estimated propensity score to check for common 
support. The results are satisfactory; showing that after the matching the mean of the covariates in the 
control and treatment group cannot be rejected to be equal in the sample. Also, the analysis of the 
estimated propensity scores leads to the conclusion that significant overlap is achieved. 
Table 10 shows the effects of financial support on the financially supported firms in the service and 
manufacturing sector. Results show that financial support has a stimulating effect on both private and 
total investment expenditure, in the manufacturing sector. Financially supported firms invest 2% more 
of their sales in innovation than non-supported firms. This result indicates that not only no crowding-out 
effect exists, but also that financial support increases the private innovation investment. On the 
contrary, in the service sector the mean of private IE effort is positive but not significantly different from 
zero, while the total investment is higher in the treated firms. This also signals that there is no crowding 
out effect; instead firms add the amount of the support to their private investment. This let us conclude 
that in none of two sectors there is crowding-out effects, and that for the manufacturing sector there is 
evidence of a positive effect on the private investment as well. 
R&D investment as a proportion of innovation expenditure is higher in treated firms, both in the service 
and manufacturing sectors. Innovative sales are higher in financially supported firms than in non-treated 
firms, in both manufacturing and service sector. This effect is larger in the service sector than in the 
manufacturing sector (where is 9%), amounting to 20% higher innovative sales than non-financially 
supported firms in the service sector. Productivity is higher in financially supported firms relative non-
treated firms in the service sector, while in the manufacturing sector this effect is negative but not 
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statically significant. The first result is unexpected given the short period in which the evaluation is 
performed.  Finally, there are no significant effects on applied patents. 
 
Table 10. Financial support effects on supported firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep variable IE effort 
Private IE 





              
Service sector 4.370** 1.490 8.753* 20.73*** 0.0632 0.366** 
  (1.815) (1.223) (4.969) (7.287) (0.0487) (0.178) 
              
Treated group 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Off support 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Potential control group 1,758 1,758 1,776 1,775 1,777 1,778 
              
Manufacturing sector 4.402** 1.951* 6.704** 9.924* -0.0139 -0.0102 
  (1.999) (1.159) (3.303) (5.240) (0.0224) (0.110) 
              
Treated group 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Off support 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Potential control group 1,156 1,156 1,157 1,156 1,158 1,159 
Notes: 1/ Share of innovation expenditure that is R&D, 2/ Share of sales due to innovation.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 100 replications *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
When restricting the sample to firms with positive innovation expenditure (table 11), the mean 
difference in private effort between treated and control is not statistically significant in both sectors. 
This means that there is no crowding-out effects of public financial support. Also is there no stimulating 
effect, neither in the total innovation expenditure, R&D expenditure as a proportion of innovation 
expenditure, applied patents or private effort. Also, the effects on innovative sales and productivity are 
not significant. 
Table 11. Financial support effects on supported firms if IE>0 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IE effort 
Private 





              
Service sector 2.866 -0.0910 4.364 6.341 0.0288 0.230 
  (1.908) (1.227) (5.793) (8.986) (0.0615) (0.174) 
              
18 
 
Treated group 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Off support 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Potential control group 684 684 684 684 684 684 
              
Manufacturing sector 3.005 0.501 3.912 4.585 -0.0435 0.00676 
  (1.899) (1.287) (3.662) (4.955) (0.0333) (0.125) 
              
Treated group 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Off support 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Potential control group 698 698 698 698 698 698 
Notes: 1/ Share of innovation expenditure that is R&D, 2/ Share of sales due to innovation.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 100 replications *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
To summarize, when analyzing the differential impact of financial support in the service and 
manufacturing sector, the results lead to the conclusion that there is no crowding-out effect of private 
funds by public funds in any of the two sectors, but there are no effects on firms that would carry out 
innovation activities in any case. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the impact of public financial support on innovation using quasi-experimental 
methods and innovation survey data from Uruguay for the manufacturing and service sectors. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it presents an impact evaluation of public 
financial support to innovation on innovation expenditure. Therefore the analysis is extended beyond 
the R&D context. Second, we analyze the possible heterogeneity of impacts on services and 
manufacturing. Finally, the evaluation is for a middle income developing Latin American country, where 
the empirical evidence is scarce. 
Results lead to the conclusion that there is no crowding-out effect of private funds by public funds, and 
that public financing in Uruguay seems to induce some increase in private innovation effort. Moreover, 
financial support induces some increase in R&D expenditure as a proportion of innovation expenditure 
and in innovative sales. But public funds do not significantly stimulate private expenditures of firms that 
would carry out innovation activities in the absence of financial support.  
When analyzing the differential impact of financial support in the service and manufacturing sector, the 
results lead to the conclusion that there is no crowding-out effect of private funds by public funds in any 
of the two sectors and there is a crowding in effect on manufacturing firms. The positive impact of 
public funding on R&D and innovative sales is bigger in the service sector. An unexpected (given the 
short run evaluation that we are conducting) positive effect of public funding on productivity was fund 
in the case of services.  
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When the control group is restricted to firms that innovate the above mentioned positive effects vanish. 
This implies that the positive effects are probably coming from an inducement effect, i.e. firms are 
induced to innovate thanks to the public funding.  
The previous results call for a re-thinking in terms of public innovation policy. On one hand, there is 
evidence of the bias towards manufacturing firms in terms of public financial support. But results show 
that the positive effects could be even bigger for services firms. This result raises the question of how 
public funds are and should be targeted to the service sector.  
Finally, more research is needed in the area of relative effectiveness of different instruments of support 
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Table A.1. Summary of the available evidence 
Author(s) Country Policy measure Outcome 
variable(s) and 
impact 
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Hall (1993) USA Fiscal incentives R&D expenditure 
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Netherlands Fiscal incentives Wages of R&D 
workers: 
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production (1997-
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Table B.1. Effects from financial support. Sample without imputed observations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




sales R&D Patents Productivity 
              
ATT 4.534*** 2.134** 15.23*** 5.032* 0.0154 -0.0263 
  (1.489) (1.027) (4.672) (3.015) (0.0312) (0.130) 
              
Treated group 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Off support 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Potential control group 1861 1861 1861 1861 1861 1861 
(2) Share of sales due to innovation. (3) Share of innovation expenditure that is R&D. (4) Applied for patents.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 100 replications *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table B.2. Effects from financial support using sample with IE>0. Sample without imputed 
observations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




sales R&D Patents Productivity 
              
ATT 3.335** 0.903 6.690 2.511 0.00281 -0.0981 
  (1.508) (1.111) (5.721) (3.516) (0.0357) (0.119) 
              
Treated group 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Off support 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Potential control group 918 918 918 918 918 918 
(2) Share of sales due to innovation. (3) Share of innovation expenditure that is R&D. (4) Applied for patents.  






















Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t Treated Control %bias bias t p>t
Size Unmatched 4.69 3.70 63.7 4.4 0 4.74 4.18 35.3 2.30 0.02
Matched 4.57 4.44 8.5 86.6 0.38 0.704 4.62 4.48 8.7 75.2 0.39 0.70
Foreign Unmatched 0.08 0.09 -6.2 -0.37 0.714 0.08 0.15 -21.1 -1.14 0.33
 owned Matched 0.08 0.10 -9 -46.9 -0.38 0.708 0.08 0.16 -23.8 -12.7 -0.98 0.35
Age Unmatched 23.90 18.25 24.9 1.89 0.058 23.95 20.64 13.8 0.94 0.51
Matched 24.34 18.75 24.7 1.1 1.02 0.31 24.41 20.64 15.7 -13.7 0.66 0.38
Patent Unmatched 0.05 0.01 22.6 2.2 0.028 0.05 0.03 12.5 0.88 0.97
obtained Matched 0.05 0.03 11.2 50.4 0.41 0.681 0.05 0.05 1 91.8 0.04 0.97
K/L Unmatched 0.84 0.65 11.7 0.58 0.565 0.86 0.74 5.2 0.24 0.81
Matched 0.86 0.79 4.1 64.5 0.18 0.861 0.88 0.63 10.9 -110.7 0.98 0.33
Productivity t-1 Unmatched 13.39 13.10 25.5 1.73 0.084 13.40 13.31 8.2 0.53 0.60
Matched 13.41 13.29 10.4 59.3 0.44 0.665 13.42 13.42 -0.4 94.7 -0.02 0.99
Network Unmatched 0.28 0.20 19.4 1.28 0.2 0.26 0.30 -8.9 -0.52 0.60
Matched 0.29 0.21 18.8 2.9 0.8 0.429 0.27 0.25 4.8 46 0.21 0.84
Group Unmatched 0.15 0.14 3.3 0.21 0.833 0.16 0.20 -12 -0.69 0.49
Matched 0.16 0.13 8.8 -164.8 0.38 0.702 0.16 0.20 -8.9 26 -0.37 0.70
Stores Unmatched 4.79 3.39 5.7 0.27 0.791 4.89 6.07 -3 -0.14 0.89
Matched 4.89 2.95 7.9 -39.2 0.95 0.344 5.00 3.22 4.6 -51.1 0.83 0.41
In Montevideo Unmatched 0.8718 0.7353 34.7 1.92 0.055 0.8947 0.7988 26.7 1.45 0.15








Figure C.1. Propensity score of treated and potencial controls considering all firms (left panel) and 





Unma tched %reduct %reductt-tes t
Va riabl e Matched Treated Control %bias bia s t p>t Treated Control %bia s bia s p>t
Size Unma tched 4.22 3.81 36.6 2.83 0.006 4.22 4.12 8.9 0.69
Matched 4.22 4.21 1.3 96.5 0.08 0.773 4.26 4.29 -2.9 67.6 -0.18
Foreign Unma tched 0.10 0.13 -9.8 -0.77 0.651 0.10 0.18 -22.4 -1.64
 owned Matched 0.10 0.17 -21.5 -119.3 -1.2 0.841 0.10 0.19 -25.9 -15.6 -1.45
Age Unma tched 32.29 27.48 21.8 1.9 0.973 31.93 29.09 12.5 1.03
Matched 32.29 28.01 19.4 11.1 1.19 0.635 32.57 28.84 16.4 -31.2 0.97
Patent Unma tched 0.03 0.03 0.6 0.05 0.008 0.03 0.04 -8.8 -0.65
obtained Matched 0.03 0.04 -7.8 -1149 -0.42 0.721 0.03 0.05 -12.1 -37.2 -0.66
K/L Unma tched 0.52 0.59 -6.7 -0.43 0.401 0.53 0.72 -17.7 -1.13
Matched 0.52 0.66 -12.9 -94.3 -0.81 0.422 0.54 0.73 -17.6 0.5 -0.95
Productivity t-1 Unma tched 13.93 13.78 16.2 1.2 0.444 13.92 14.05 -15.3 -1.15
Matched 13.93 13.90 2.5 84.6 0.15 0.787 13.94 14.05 -12.4 19.1 -0.70
Network Unma tched 0.17 0.10 19.7 1.81 0.001 0.17 0.14 7 0.58
Matched 0.17 0.12 14.1 28.7 0.81 0.964 0.17 0.16 4.3 37.8 0.24
Group Unma tched 0.18 0.15 6.8 0.58 0.058 0.17 0.19 -6.6 -0.52
Matched 0.18 0.17 1.8 74 0.1 0.684 0.17 0.20 -5.9 10.6 -0.33
Stores Unma tched 1.85 1.81 1.9 0.12 0.958 1.86 1.83 1.7 0.11
Matched 1.85 1.76 4.3 -130 0.25 0.654 1.87 1.61 13.7 -717.3 1.14
In Montevideo 0.8333 0.7915 10.7 0.85 0.831 0.7927 9.8 0.76




Figure C.2. Propensity score of treated and potencial controls considering all firms (left panel) and 
only observations with positive innovation expenditure (right panel). Manufacturing sector 
 
 
 
